ANALYSIS: What Washington Wants From the Next Iraqi Prime Minister
Amid Washington’s renewed push to dismantle Iran-backed power networks in Baghdad, five figures are emerging as likely contenders for Iraq’s post-election premiership.
Tamer Badawi
Note: This post might be updated as more verifiable information becomes available.
Publishing date: 28 October 2025
INCIDENT/DEVELOPMENT: In the electoral absence of the National Shia Movement led by cleric Muqtada Sadr, Iraq’s next parliament, should elections take place on time, is set to be dominated by Coordination Framework (CF) parties, a constellation of Axis of Resistance (AoR)-aligned figures, and CF-co-opted independents.
Such a parliamentary composition will likely run counter to Washington’s recently intensifying efforts to weaken Axis-aligned groups and erode their hold over state institutions, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq, where Tehran’s influence is declining amid growing domestic and regional pressures on the Islamic Republic.
Washington has now articulated what amounts to a checklist for securing its political approval of Iraq’s next prime minister:
Disarmament or restructuring of Iran-backed militias and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Complete curtailment of financial and sanctions-evasion Iraqi networks tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its Quds Force (IRGC/IRGC-QF).
Preferential access for US investors in key Iraqi sectors and driving out Chinese investors.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN? Washington’s approval of a nominee will be enmeshed with extensive bargaining and negotiations between Iraqi political stakeholders, including the Sadrists.
The following five figures may have varying chances of becoming nominated after the elections. (Note that sequencing does not imply importance.)
Hamid Al-Shatri
Hamid Al-Shatri (full name: Hamid Rashid Fleih Sahi), the director of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) since mid-December 2024, is emerging as a likely Coordination Framework (CF) candidate for prime minister, supported by Dawa Party leader Nouri Al-Maliki, the CF’s primus inter pares.
Although known to have been a Dawa Party affiliate in the past, Shatri does not project himself as a partisan actor. In public, he is regarded as a diplomatic, modest, and approachable official.
Since assuming leadership of Iraq’s external intelligence agency, coinciding with regime change in Syria, Shatri has drawn domestic and regional attention for his public meetings with Ahmed al-Sharaa, president of the Syrian Transitional Government. These engagements have underscored Baghdad’s readiness to conduct visible diplomacy with Syria’s new and controversial political leadership.
Al-Shatri’s public outreach to Damascus, coupled with his expansive portfolio bridging domestic and foreign security policy, has become his defining hallmark and may serve as the principal rationale for his political nomination by the CF following the November 2025 elections.
If selected, Shatri is likely to draw on his diplomatic experience in Syria to pursue an approach reminiscent of former Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s tenure, particularly his facilitation of Iranian-Saudi dialogue in Baghdad.
If domestic and regional conditions permit, Shatri may seek to play a mediating role in resuming Iranian-Syrian relations, among other possible regional engagements.
A veteran insider, Shatri previously held senior positions across Iraq’s security architecture, including as head and deputy head of the National Security Service (NSS) and the general director of the Ministry of Interior’s Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism Department.
During his tenure at the NSS, if not even prior, Shatri developed a close working relationship with Falih Al-Fayyad (designated by OFAC), chairman of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and former director of the NSS, a key CF figure and political ally of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani.
Shatri previously worked as an assistant to Falih Al-Fayyad in the latter’s capacity as a PMF chairman in organizing Arab Sunni fighters as auxiliary forces with the PMF during the war against the Islamic State group (ISIS).
Having moved across sensitive security agencies, including the PMF, and having a past with the Dawa Party, Shatri is likely to be viewed positively by Tehran as a candidate for Iraq’s premiership.
A few months before Shatri’s appointment to the INIS, Michael Knights described the INIS as “militia-penetrated.” However, it remains unclear how Shatri is currently perceived in Washington.
Qassim Al-Araji
Qassim al-Araji (full name: Qassim Mohammed Jalal al-Araji), Iraq’s current National Security Advisor and former Minister of Interior under Haider al-Abadi (2014–18), is among the likely contenders for the premiership. His candidacy is expected to be advanced by Coordination Framework (CF) heavyweight and Badr Organization leader Hadi Al-Ameri.
After 2004, the Ministry of Interior has been largely dominated by the Iran-backed Badr Organization and other parties. Numerically, Badr is the largest component of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), as well as affiliated networks within sections of the Iraqi Army.
Araji’s previous deep-rooted role within Badr, backed by the IRGC, makes him a relatively trusted figure among Iran-aligned political and armed factions. Yet, it remains uncertain whether Badr can marshal sufficient consensus within the CF to secure his nomination.
Al-Ameri has often served as an intermediary between cleric Muqtada Sadr and Iran-backed factions, a dynamic that may work in Araji’s favor. Al-Araji himself maintains a long history of engagement with the Sadrists.
In his current post, Araji oversees sensitive national security portfolios, notably overseeing security agreements with Iran and the coordination of efforts to repatriate Islamic State (ISIS) detainees and their families from Al-Hol Camp in northeastern Syria. Those responsibilities have placed him in frequent contact with Iranian officials, Western diplomats, and international non-governmental organizations.
Araji’s international engagement, combined with his extensive security credentials, constitutes the core of the political profile, or brand, he is seeking to project as a candidate. Araji is very likely to be viewed in Tehran as a friendly candidate.
Assad Al-Eidani
Assad Al-Eidani (full name: Asaad Abdul-Amir Abdul-Ghaffar Mahawi Al-Eidani) is the current governor of Basra and the president of ‘Tasmim’ electoral alliance, running for the November elections.
He has gained a relative amount of popularity locally for advancing infrastructure projects and promoting development initiatives.
In 2019, during the 2018-2021 parliamentary term, Eidani was nominated by the Iran-aligned Al-Bina Alliance to succeed Adel Abdul-Mahdi amid the violent suppression of the Tishreen protest movement. However, then-President Barham Salih rejected his nomination and even offered his resignation in protest.
A businessman by background, Eidani began his political career within the Iraqi National Congress (INC). His rise in Basra’s politics, however, is largely attributed to his pragmatism and ability to navigate local power struggles, particularly through alliances and bargaining with the Hikmah National Movement. (HNM was formerly part of ISCI before splitting in July 2017.)
In the 2018 national elections, Eidani ran as a candidate with the Nasr Coalition led by former Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi. Although he secured a parliamentary seat representing Basra, he declined to assume the position, opting instead to remain as governor.
If positioned in the upcoming race, Eidani’s candidacy is expected to center on his pragmatism, administrative record, and outlook as a business-oriented prime minister.
Adnan Al-Zurfi
Adnan al-Zurfi (full name: Adnan Abd-Khdair Abbas Mattar Al-Zurfi) is the Secretary-General of Harakat al-Wafa’a al-Iraqiya, a liberal political party. Zurfi is the president of ‘Al-Badeel’ electoral alliance, running for the November elections.
A vocal critic of Iran-backed paramilitary networks, Zurfi is widely regarded as a strong advocate for closer ties with the United States. In a recent media interview, he expressed support for a US-led regional order.
Al-Zurfi was nominated as prime minister-designate by then-President Barham Salih in early 2020. However, his candidacy was rejected by major Shia powerbrokers, including Nouri Al-Maliki, Hadi Al-Ameri, and Qais Al-Khazali, as well as by Sunni political allies.
A former member of the Dawa Party, Zurfi split from the Islamist movement in 2004 but maintained his new party’s proximity to Maliki’s faction. Following the 2014 elections, he joined Maliki’s State of Law coalition.
In 2018, he shifted to Haider Al-Abadi’s more centrist Nasr Coalition, where he later served as the bloc’s parliamentary head.
Favored by Washington, Zurfi first served as governor of Najaf in 2005 and again in 2015. Between 2006 and 2009, he held the position of Assistant Deputy Minister of Interior for Intelligence Affairs.
Al-Zurfi’s political leverage stems from his role as a pragmatic conduit between Washington and Iraq’s traditional Shia parties, particularly Dawa.
While Dawa and its affiliates may benefit from his access to US policymakers, Zurfi, in turn, likely relies on Maliki’s protection against domestic rivals, including Iran-aligned paramilitary networks.
Zurfi is unlikely to be favored by Tehran to become the next prime minister, yet if pressured, the Iranian establishment may engage with him pragmatically.
Mohammad Shia Al-Sudani
Iraq’s current prime minister, Mohammad Shia Al-Sudani, is seeking a second term in office, a feat achieved only by former premier Nouri Al-Maliki. Sudani is leading the ‘Construction and Development’ electoral alliance running for the November elections.
Within the Coordination Framework (CF), Sudani’s rise from a technocratic “general manager” to a formidable political actor has unsettled established power centers, notably Maliki and Qais Al-Khazali. While Maliki remains opposed to Sudani’s reappointment, Khazali’s stance is less definitive. Other CF figures, such as Haidar Al-Abadi and Ammar Al-Hakim, appear more accommodating of Sudani’s ambitions.
Initially perceived as a consensus candidate aligned with Tehran’s interests, Sudani’s tenure since 2022 has seen a gradual recalibration. Mounting US pressure on Iran, combined with Sudani’s own political aspirations, is driving him to widen his maneuvering space. Securing a second term will likely require a measure of goodwill from Washington, even as he continues to balance CF expectations.
According to a 23 October report by Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper, close to Hezbollah, an unnamed source claimed that IRGC-QF Commander Esmail Ghaani “informed Framework leaders of the need to prevent internal divisions before the elections and to ensure that Sudani does not drift behind American promises of support for his second term in exchange for action against the factions.”
Sudani’s prospects for a renewed mandate remain finely balanced, shaped by domestic factional dynamics and regional volatility. Any major geopolitical escalation, particularly an Israel-led conflict spillover, could disrupt Iraq’s electoral calendar or force a postponement, extending the uncertainty surrounding his political future.
WHAT IS NEXT? If elections proceed as scheduled on 11 November, the selection of Iraq’s next prime minister will serve as a key indicator of how far the Coordination Framework (CF) is prepared to accommodate Washington’s interests, whether through the candidate chosen or the composition of the cabinet.
The Trump administration is unlikely to accept a government dominated by figures with militant or paramilitary affiliations. Alternatively, if elections are postponed, a plausible ‘wild card’ scenario, Prime Minister Sudani could remain in office for an extended period, consolidating his position until the polls are eventually held.